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METHODOLOGY FOR QRA STUDY

METHODOLOGY FOR QUANTITATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT (QRA) STUDY

Proposed Methodology

1.     Introduction

QRA is a technique used to systematically calculate the risks from hazardous events. It involves predicting the size of consequences associated with a hazard, and the frequency at which a release of the hazard may be expected to occur. These aspects are then combined in order to obtain numerical values for risk – usually risk of fatality.

QRA includes consideration of all identified hazardous events in order to quantify the overall risk levels. Similar hazardous events are often grouped and assessed together as bounding or representative events.

 2.    Methodology

The QRA Study included the following steps:

  1. Identification of Hazards (Fire / Explosion / uncontrolled release of Hazardous material/ Flash Fire / Jet Fire / Vapor Cloud Explosion (VCE) Unconfined Vapor Cloud Explosion (UVCE), etc.)

  2. Identification of Maximum Credible Accident (MCA) scenario.

  3. Frequency Analysis using an internationally accepted database and Evaluation of the likelihood of occurrence of possible events.

  4. Consequence modelling and analysis for the identified hazard covering impact on people and potential escalation by using PHAST (process hazard analysis software tool) Risk

  5. Estimation of Individual Risk (IR) and Societal Risk (SR)

  6. Recommendations.

Figure 1:QRA Methodology Flow sheet 

3.    Hazard Identification

The hazardous scenarios considered in the QRA for the project facility will be identified based on the properties of the materials handled and the identification of the potential hazards in the pipeline systems which could lead to loss of containment events. 

4.    Consequence Analysis

The following activities comprise the consequence analysis which is carried out for the project facility:

  • Review of the P&ID’s to determine process streams;

  • Identification of isolatable sections based on the location of Shutdown Valves;

  • Review of the design basis to obtain the properties of the stream (e.g. pressure, temperature,  composition and density) and

  • Calculation of the inventory within the isolatable sections.

  • Consequence modelling is conducted to evaluate the effect distances of the identified Loss of  Containment (LOC) scenarios and their impact on people. This consequence analysis will be carried out using PHAST 6.7 software. 

5.    Frequency Analysis

Once the potential release scenarios are identified, the next stage is to estimate the failure frequencies  (likelihood for the event to occur) based on international standard databases.

The frequency analysis will be performed as follows:

  • Identification of the base failure frequencies applicable to the product pipelines from the relevant  international standard databases;

  • The total failure frequencies will be derived from the combination of the time in use factor of the pipelines/tanks with the base failure frequency data.

6.    Risk Assessment

Risk assessment will be undertaken to evaluate the risk associated with the project facilities. The  consequence analysis results and failure frequencies will be combined using PHAST RISK 6.7 software. The  risk shall be typically presented as Location Specific Individual Risk (LSIR) contours overlaid on a map and  Individual Risk Per Annum (IRPA).

7.    Risk Evaluation

It involves the evaluation of the individual risk results against the UK HSE Risk Acceptance Criteria to determine whether the risks are broadly acceptable, ALARP or unacceptable and to make some professional judgements about the significance of the risks.

8.    Risk Reduction Measures

Based on the risk evaluation, if the calculated risks fall in the unacceptable region or in the ALARP region, risk  reduction measures shall be implemented in order to reduce the risk to a tolerable or ALARP region. All  physically possible risk reduction measures shall be identified, which could be new measures or  improvements to existing measures already installed/ implemented. The risk evaluation after implementation of recommendation/ risk reduction measures shall be carried out to demonstrate that the risk shall be reduced to the ALARP region and the study recommendations are adequate for the project.

9.    Consequence Analysis

This section describes the approach used for the consequence analysis whereby consequence models are built based on the identified LOC scenarios of the project facility. The consequences of the release of hazardous substances by failures or catastrophes as well as the damage to the surrounding area can be  determined by means of consequence modelling. Models help to calculate the physical effects resulting from  a release of hazardous substances and help to translate the physical effects in terms of injury or fatality to the exposed personnel.

The techniques used to model the consequences of the hazardous material releases cover the following:

  • Modelling of discharge rates when holes develop in pipeline systems.

  • Modelling of the flammable clouds from releases to the atmosphere.

  • Modelling of the heat radiation field of the releases that are ignited and burn as jet fire and flash  fire.

  • Modelling of explosion overpressure from releases.

10.   Consequence Modelling

Discharge Rate

The initial rate of release through a leak depends mainly on the pressure inside the equipment, size of the  hole and phases of the release (liquid, gas or two phase). The release rate decreases with time as the  equipment depressurizes. The reduction mainly on the inventory and the actions taken to isolate the leak  and blow-down the equipment

Dispersion

A vapour cloud may be formed when a vaporizing liquid is released for an extended duration. If the gas cloud  does not immediately ignite, it disperses based on the prevalent wind direction, speed and stability category  (i.e. degree of turbulence).

The cloud dispersion simulation is carried out to provide the distance (from the leak) at which the  concentration of flammable material falls below the Lower Flammability Limit (LFL).

Consequence Events

The following describes the probabilities associated with the sequence of events which must take place for  the incident scenarios to produce hazardous effects. Considering the present case, the outcomes expected  are:

  • Flash Fire (FF);

  • Jet fires;

  •  Pool fire;

  • Vapour Cloud Explosion

Flash Fire

The vapour/gas release from a pool would disperse under the influence of the prevailing wind; with material  concentration in air reducing with distance. At a particular location downwind, the concentration will drop  below its lower flammable level (LFL) value. If ignited within the flammable envelope, the mass of the  material available between the LFL and ½ LFL will be likely to burn as a flash fire; rapidly spreading through  the cloud from the point of ignition back to the source of release.

Although flash fires are generally low intensity transitory events, the burning velocity is quite high and  escape following ignition is not possible. Flash fires often remain close to the ground, where most ignition  sources are present. It is assumed that personnel caught inside a flash fire will not survive while those  outside suffer no significant harm. If other combustible material is present within the flash fire it is also likely  to ignite, and a secondary fire could result.

Jet Fire

Jet fire causes damage due to the resulting heat radiation. The working level heat radiation impact will vary  widely depending on the angle of the flame to the horizontal plane, which in turn mainly depends on the  location of the leak. The flame direction was considered horizontal for consequence analysis of leaks and  ruptures from process equipment. Jet fire heat radiation impacts were estimated for the identified credible  and worst-case scenarios.

Upon accidental leakage, the pressurized fluid will disperse as a jet, initially moving forward in the spatial  direction of the leak until the kinetic energy is lost and gravity slumping or lifting of the cloud occurs,  dependent upon whether the fluid is heavier or lighter than air.

The primary hazard associated with jet fires is thermal radiation and potential for flame impingement on  adjacent pipelines/equipment, resulting in escalation. High pressure releases have the potential to cover  large areas due to its relatively large flame length. However, the effects of escalation are minimized if the  flame length reduces to less than the separation distance between other equipment and the jet fire source.

Pool Fire

A liquid pool is formed during a prolonged leakage if the rate of leakage exceeds the rate of vaporization. On  ignition, this would result in a pool fire whose size/radius would depend on the mass flow rate, ambient  temperature, heat of vaporization of material released, vapour pressure, duration of discharge and effects of  containment or dykes. The pool fire could cause damage to equipment or injury/fatality to personnel due to  thermal radiation effects.

A pool fire is not envisaged for liquid systems that are highly pressurized. Any leak or rupture would result in  a pressurized release leading to a liquid jet fire or flash fire.

Vapour Cloud Explosion

Vapour cloud explosion is the result of flammable materials in the atmosphere, a subsequent dispersion  phase, and after some delay an ignition of the vapour cloud. Turbulence is the governing factor in blast  generation which could intensify combustion to the level that will result in an explosion. Turbulence is often  created by obstacles in the path of vapour cloud or when the cloud finds a confined area, as under the  bullets. Insignificant level of confinement will result in a flash fire. The VCE will result in overpressures.

11.   Selection Of Damage Criteria

The damage criteria give the relation between the extents of the physical effects (exposure) and the effect of consequences. For assessing, the effects on human consequences are expressed in terms of injuries and the effects on equipment / property in terms of monetary loss.

The effect of consequences for explosion or fire can be categorized as:

  • Damage caused by heat radiation on material and people

  • Damage caused by explosion on structure and people

In Consequence analysis studies, three types of exposure to hazardous effects are distinguished:

  • Heat radiation due to fires - in this study, the concern is that of Jet fires and pool fires

  • Explosions

  • Toxic effects from toxic materials or toxic combustion products.

The knowledge about these relations depends strongly on the nature of the exposure.

Following are the criteria selected for damage estimation:

Heat Radiation

The effect of fire on a human being is in the form of burns. There are three categories of burn such as first degree, second degree and third-degree burns. The consequences caused by exposure to heat radiation are a function of:

  • The radiation energy onto the human body [kW/m2];

  • The exposure duration [sec];

  • The protecting layer of the skin tissue (clothed or naked body).

The limits for 1% fatality to the people exposed by heat radiation, and for second-degree burns are given in the table below:

Table 1 : Damages to human life due to heat radiation

Exposure Duration

Radiation energy

(1% lethality), kW/m2

Radiation energy (2nd degree burns), kW/m2

Radiation energy (1st degree burns), kW/m2

10 sec

21.2

16

12.5

30 sec

9.3

7.0

4.0

Table 2 : Effects due to incident radiation intensity

Incident Radiation (Kw/m2)

Type of Damage

0.7

Equivalent to Solar Radiation

4.0

Sufficient to cause pain within 20 sec. Blistering of skin (first degree burns are likely)

12.5

Minimum energy required for piloted ignition of wood, melting plastic tubing etc.

37.5

Heavy Damage to process equipment

 

Reference: CCPS, Guidelines for Chemical Process Quantitative Risk Analysis. The actual results would be less severe due to the various assumptions made in the models arising out of the flame geometry, emissivity, angle of incidence, view factor and others. The radiation output of the flame would be dependent upon the fire size, extent of mixing with air and the flame temperature. Some fraction of the radiation is absorbed by carbon dioxide and water vapor in the intervening atmosphere. Finally, the incident flux at an observer location would depend upon the radiation view factor, which is a function of the distance from the flame surface, the observer’s orientation and the flame geometry.

 Table 3 : Damage due to overpressures

Peak Overpressure

Damage Type

Description

0.50 bar

Heavy Damage

Major damage to plant equipment structure

0.30 bar

Moderate Damage

Repairable damage to plant equipment and structure

0.1 bar

Significant Damage

Shattering of glass

Some chemicals will have detrimental impact on humans and animals if inhaled. Effects of toxic chemicals are measured by IDLH, ERPG, STEL etc.

12.   PROBABILITIES

Population Probabilities

It is necessary to know the population exposure to estimate the risk resulting from an incident. The exposed population is often defined using either a population density or population data.

Failure Probabilities

This step deals with determining how often – in terms of frequency per year – loss of containment events is likely to occur. The likelihood of occurrence of identified hazardous scenarios is assessed by reviewing the historical industry accident data.

Weather Probabilities

The weather and wind data considered will be either provided by client or will be taken from local meteorological center. 

Risk Calculation

This step involves calculating risk considering both severity of the consequences of an identified hazard and the probability of its occurrence

Risk = Likelihood of Occurrences X Severity of Consequences

Risk is calculated using software SAFETI by DNV. The software takes the input from Frequency Analysis and Consequence Assessment Tasks. Risk is presented numerically and graphically.

Risk Assessment

This step deals with comparing the calculated risk with the acceptable risk values.

13.   Consequence Contours 

Figure 2: Medium Leak Explosion Effects

 

Figure 3: Medium Leak Flash Fire

14.   Report

The methodology, study findings and recommendations from the QRA study will be    presented in a comprehensive report.

Information Required

1. Plot Plan/Layout (with scale) 

2. Piping and Instrumentation Diagrams (P&IDs) 

3. Piping general assembly drawings 

4. Aerial snapshot of site (preferably high resolution) or Google Earth coordinates 

5. Facility Description 

6. Operating Manual 

7. Heat & Mass balance Sheet 

8. Process Description 

9. Process Flow Diagram 

10. Cause and Effect Diagram 

11. Emergency Shutdown Philosophy 

12. Population Details (Location and Number) 

  • Onsite Population 

  • Offsite Population (Public) 

13.     Site Meteorology 

  • Wind speed and direction 

  • Atmospheric stability conditions 

14.     Ignition sources 

  • Onsite and Offsite ignition sources 

15.  Other Information 

  • History of Past Accidents and near misses 

  • OLD QRA Report if any 

  • Old HAZID / HAZOP Report

15.   Guideline Used for QRA Study

  • TNO PURPLE Book

16.   Software to be used

  • PHAST V 8.2 & SAFETI V 8.2 FOR CONSEQUENCE AND  RISK ESTIMATION

17.   Documents Deliverables

  • EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

  • INTRODUCTION

  • STUDY SCOPE OF WORK

  • OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY

  • ABOUT THE SOFTWARE

  • FACILITY DESCRIPTION

  • OVERVIEW OF RISK ASSESSMENT

  • QRA METHODOLGY

  •  HAZARD IDENTIFICATION

  • INVENTORY ANALYSIS

  • FREQUENCY ANALYSIS

  • EVENT TREE ANALYSIS (ETA)

  •  IGNITION PROBABILITIES

  •  CONSEQUENCE ASSESSMENT

  • SELECTION OF DAMAGE CRITERIA

  • Risk Assessment

  • WINDROSE

  •  HAZARD IDENTIFICATION

  • Materials Properties

  • Dyke Details

  • FREQUENCY ASSESSMENT

  • PES MARKUP

  • PROCESS RISK ASSESSMENT

  •  Location Specific Individual Risk

  • Individual Risk Per Annum (IRPA) and Potential Loss of Life (PLL)

  • PLL Calculations

  • SOCIETAL RISK

  • CONSEQUENCE RESULTS

  • Fire and Explosion Results

  • Exceedance Curves:

  • MAJOR RISK CONTRIBUTORS

  • CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

  • LIST OF ANNEXURES]

  • REFERENCES

  • Annexure-01 Assumption Register

  • Annexure-02 Isolatable Section Marked P&ID



DISCLAIMER

HSE Risk Management Services Private Limited accepts no liability or responsibility whatsoever for it in respect of any use of or reliance upon this Methodology by any third party.

Copying this Methodology without the permission of HSE Risk Management Services Private Limited is not permitted.